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THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY IN INDIAN LAW
Judge William C. Canby, Jr.∗
In order to approach the subject of equality in Indian law, I reviewed
Judge Betty Fletcher’s numerous Indian law opinions. It has been a
privilege to serve as a colleague of Judge Fletcher for nearly thirty years
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit during which
time Judge Fletcher has served as the conscience of our court. In
examining her opinions I looked for ringing phrases, calling Indian
supporters to the figurative barricades, but found none. All of the
opinions I read were careful, technically fine-tuned, and seemed to
spring sensibly from the precedent they discussed. I have to say that
Judge Fletcher is the least self-indulgent judge I have ever read. She
seems to think that it is not her place to fill an opinion with her hopes
and fears, delirium, or angst. What restraint! What I cannot figure out is
how she can make the law come out with such consistently good results.
If you ask someone on the street what he or she thinks of the status of
Indians, the answer (if it is a non-Indian) is likely to be: Why are Indians
treated any differently from anyone else? The answer, of course, is
history. In numerous treaties or other agreements, Indians yielded much
of their territory to those of us who now occupy it, reserving small
portions to themselves and their tribes—hence the term “reservations.”
These were government-to-government arrangements, and nothing is
more important to the contemporary tribal Indian than recognition of this
point, and an honoring of tribal government at least equally with, say,
state government. That is the equality upon which the tribes insist. And
when we recognize a government in our midst, we cannot treat its
constituents exactly as we treat ourselves.
This brings me to Judge Fletcher’s opinion in Nevada v. Hicks.1 This
decision was reversed by the Supreme Court.2 It happens to the best of
∗ William C. Canby, Jr. is a circuit judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. This presentation is adapted from an address given at the Washington Law Review and the
University of Washington School of Law Symposium: A Tribute to the Honorable Betty Binns
Fletcher. The views stated herein are personal to the speaker and do not represent the views of the
court.
1. 196 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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us. In fact, it seems to happen to the best of us more than anyone else.
In Hicks, state officers suspected that a tribal member who lived on
trust land on a Nevada reservation had violated game laws offreservation by taking some mountain sheep. They went to state court for
a search warrant. The warrant they received noted that the state court’s
writ did not run into Indian country, and that the officers would need to
get the approval of the tribal court for a search. The officers did, and the
tribal court narrowed the scope of the search somewhat. The state
officers, accompanied by tribal officers, performed the search and
confiscated one mounted sheep head. The sheep was soon determined
not to have been a protected variety, and the trophy head was returned.
The suspicions continued, however, and about a year later the officers
obtained another search warrant, with the same caveat. They went to
tribal court and got approval for a search, which, like the previous one,
was conducted with tribal officers, and one or more additional trophy
heads were removed. They, too, were found not to be illegal and were
returned. Later, Hicks sued the officers in tribal court for exceeding the
scope of the search and for damage to the trophies. The state officers
came to federal court to challenge the tribal court’s jurisdiction. The
district court determined that the tribal court had jurisdiction. The state
appealed, and the opinion fell to Judge Fletcher.
The legal context at the time was framed by a series of Supreme
Court decisions, starting with Montana v. United States,3 that had
increasingly restricted the authority of tribes and tribal courts over nonIndians. Judge Fletcher carefully pointed out why none of the Supreme
Court’s restrictions on tribal authority applied to this case. It was a civil
case. The claim arose on trust land, owned and controlled by the tribe.
The tribe had not ceded any of its jurisdiction by authorizing occasional
searches by state officers. “The Tribe’s unfettered power to exclude state
officers from its land implies its authority to regulate the behavior of
non-members on that land.”4 The tribal court could entertain the case. It
had already ruled that it had jurisdiction, so there was no need for further
exhaustion on that issue. So the case could proceed in tribal court.
Enter the Supreme Court, in the voice of Justice Scalia. The ruling: it
is not essential to tribal self-government that state officers be subject to
tribal control when executing a search related to suspected offreservation crime. Thus the tribe’s power over outsiders (even ones who
come on trust lands) is restricted to protection of the tribe’s self-

3. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
4. Hicks, 196 F.3d at 1028.
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government, narrowly construed.
The assumptions underlying the two opinions are 180 degrees apart.
Judge Fletcher, following all the precedent up to Hicks, assumed that
tribes are in control of their own lands unless some legitimate authority
has caused them to lose control or they have given it up voluntarily.
Justice Scalia, as I have just said, assumed that the tribes can control
only those events essential to their self-government. So everyone up to
the Supreme Court had been wrong. The state judge who knew that his
writ did not run to Indian country had been wrong. The officers who
sought permission from the tribal court and engaged the participation of
tribal officers had been wrong. The state officers could simply have
acted. And nothing in the Supreme Court’s analysis prevents application
of the same rule to arrests. Over many years, tribes and states had
worked out extradition agreements, to provide for the delivery by the
tribes of persons wanted by the states. Apparently, this effort, too, had
been misguided and unnecessary.
So what has all this got to do with equality? Well, most Indians living
on reservations would say that there is a need for equality at the
institutional level. The tribe, not the individual, is the primary unit. The
tribes want to be treated as equal governments with the states. The tribal
Indian, I daresay, would find Judge Fletcher’s concern for tribal
autonomy a protection of the kind of equality the tribes want. Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Hicks stated that a search by state
officers was no more of an intrusion on tribal self-government than a
search by federal officers was an intrusion on state self-government.
This misses the point. The tribes understand that the federal
government’s authority extends directly into the states’ and the tribes’
domains. In that regard, the states and the tribes are equal. But they are
not equal when state officers are permitted to execute searches on tribal
lands when the tribes most certainly would not be allowed to execute
searches in the states, outside of their reservation. This point may be
missed by the Supreme Court; I have often wondered whether the
Supreme Court’s recent restrictions on tribal authority stemmed more
from ignorance or hostility. Judge Fletcher’s position reflected neither of
those deficiencies.
The need for equal treatment of tribes as sovereign governments able
to deal with the federal government on a government-to-government
basis explains some of the differences in treatment of Indians and others
at the individual level. Take the statutory Indian preference in hiring for
positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. That preference was
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challenged on equal protection grounds in Morton v. Mancari.5 The
Court upheld the preference, holding that the preference did not
constitute racial or ethnic discrimination, but was a political
classification reflecting the relationship between the federal government
and recognized Indian tribes.
The political category does not always favor the individual Indian. In
United States v. Antelope,6 the Supreme Court dealt with a case in which
tribal members had killed a non-Indian during a robbery on the
reservation. They were convicted of murder under the Major Crimes
Act, which applies only to Indians in Indian country. Their challenge
arose from the fact that, if they had been non-Indian and killed the nonIndian victim they would have been tried under state law. State law
required proof of premeditation in these circumstances, while the federal
law did not. Again, the Supreme Court held that this difference was not
the result of invidious discrimination but was simply the result of an
entire legal structure that treated Indian tribes as political bodies. The
defendants were treated differently from non-Indians, not because they
were Indians, but because they were members of the recognized Coeur
d’Alene Tribe. It was enough that each legal system treated those subject
to it equally; the two systems did not have to have equal results.
One final aspect of equal protection peculiarity in Indian law: Indian
tribes as governments are not subject to the Constitution’s Bill of Rights
or Fourteenth Amendment. Those restrictions are directed at the federal
government and the states, and tribes are neither. During the 1960s
Congress became concerned about the rights of Indians vis-à-vis their
tribes, and accordingly included an Indian Civil Rights Act7 as part of
the 1968 Civil Rights Act. That Act applied the restrictions of nearly all
of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to tribes in the
exercise of their jurisdiction. Although this portion of the Act was
entitled “Rights of Indians” it applied to all persons within tribal
jurisdiction.
In the first few years of the Act, lower federal courts regularly
implied federal rights of action so that Indians could sue their tribes or
tribal officials in federal court for violations of the Act. Then the
Supreme Court decided Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.8 There, a
female tribal member who had married a man outside the tribe
5. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
6. 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
7. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
1302 (2006)).
8. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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complained because her children were not eligible for tribal
membership, but if a male tribal member married outside the tribe, his
children were eligible. The Supreme Court held that the federal court
could not entertain the case. First, the Pueblo itself enjoyed sovereign
immunity (most lower courts had held the immunity to be abrogated by
the Act). Second, injunctive relief against tribal officers was unavailable
because there was no implied right of action. Congress had provided
only one federal remedy for enforcement of the Act—habeas corpus—
that applied only to challenge custody. Since there was no custody
involved in this equal protection violation, that writ did not lie. The fact
that Congress provided only that federal remedy meant that there could
be no other. The enforcement, if any, had to be in tribal court.
One judge of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe told me that he knew now
why the Supreme Court had left the enforcement of the Indian Bill of
Rights to the tribal courts: it was because it was impossible. The idea of
the Bill of Rights, he said, was to enshrine individual freedoms and
protect them from the collective entity, the government. To a tribal
member, the health of the collective entity is the primary concern, and
the individual’s main duty is to respond in ways that support that health.
Thus the purpose to protect tribal values, one of the reasons for leaving
this matter to the tribal court, frustrated the other purpose, which was to
ensure individual rights to Indians. I have not found a solution to his
problem.
His comment, however, reflects the tension between the treatment of
tribes as political entities and the concept of equal protection, viewed
from the other side. To the non-Indian not familiar with the legal history
of federal-tribal relationships, distinct treatment of Indians is in tension
with the individual-rights assumptions underlying the equal protection
clause. To that tribal judge, the individual assumptions behind the equal
protection clause were in tension with the very concept of tribal
institutions and government. Both sides see a tension, but each considers
a different value to be paramount.
I cannot solve the judge’s dilemma. I have argued that Santa Clara
Pueblo was wrongly decided because Congress intended to impose
individual rights on the tribes, rightly or wrongly. If there were federal
review of civil rights violations by tribes, however, then there ought to
be a reversal of the trend that increasingly deprives tribes of jurisdiction
over non-Indians. That deprivation is total in criminal law and
increasingly broad in civil and regulatory matters. We have to give some
recognition to both types of equality, if we are to continue to value a
truly pluralistic society that includes tribal governments long recognized.
Perhaps the most central of all tribal prerogatives, which the courts
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have refused to intervene in for reasons even beyond the Santa Clara
decision, is tribal membership. Today, however, there are instances
where the two notions of equality are most obviously at war in
membership disputes. Membership in some tribes, notably smaller tribes
with casinos, has become extremely valuable. If a tribal council decides
to expel a dozen members of a tribe with thirty-five members and a
casino, the decision inures to the immediate and substantial financial
benefit of the members of the tribal council. One has to suspect that a
profusion of such instances, or their occurrence under particularly
suspicious circumstances, will place great stress on the usual judicial
doctrine of non-interference in internal tribal matters of membership. So
far, the doctrine has held, but courts so holding have displayed a notable
lack of enthusiasm for the result. Perhaps some restraint on more
extreme membership expulsions would protect the tribes’ long-term
viability as institutions. It is not a situation that will be easily resolved,
but there may be room for both types of equality to be served by some
sort of review of some membership issues.
Well, I have nothing more to add today about the special conditions
of equal protection in the setting of Indian law. I hope I have shed a
small bit of light on the subject. And I thank Judge Fletcher for her years
of sensitivity to tribal interests, and for her recognition of the tribes’
rights of self-government. Her work has contributed greatly to the
achievement of the kind of equality sought by the tribes—equality with
other sovereign governments.

